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ESSAYS

Slavery and Race: An Essay on
New Ideas and Enduring
Shibboleths in the Interpretation
of the American Constitutional
System

by Joseph E. Claxton*

God gave Noah the rainbow sign.
No more water, the fire next time.
African-American Spiritual1
*

Professor of Law, Mercer University School of Law. Emory University (A.B., 1968);

Duke University (J.D., 1972). Member, State Bar of Georgia.
1. This verse was the inspiration for the title of one of James Baldwin's books, The Fire
Next Time (1962). That book, like the others Baldwin wrote a generation ago, deserves
another reading.
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BACKGROUND

The signers of the Declaration of Independence boldly announced that
"[w]e hold these truths to be self-evident," but more than two centuries
later the debate over the nature and meaning of "these truths" still is
waged with vigor and, on many occasions, great passion.2 Indeed, the descriptive term "self-evident" is enough in itself to inspire fundamental
disagreement. To Americans about to enter a twenty-first century era of
ultra-technology, it sometimes must seem that unless an idea is as "selfevident" as the arithmetical concept that 1 + 1= 2, it is not self-evident at
all.
The "self-evident" truth that "all men are created equal" has illuminated and yet bedeviled the national experience of the United States.
With its additional reference to an indeterminate list of "unalienable
rights," the Declaration of Independence clearly implied the existence of
certain rights that in some sense are absolute and eternal, rights that are
essential for the preservation of mankind. "Governments are instituted
among [mien" as the instruments for securing these rights, and as a mere
instrument (and a discardable one at that), a government must bow to
the ultimate sovereign-to the governed-in order to obtain the consent
necessary for its continued legitimacy.8
The combination of equality and popular sovereignty in the Declaration of Independence is a combustible mixture. For over two centuries,
thoughtful Americans have struggled intellectually, and in their hearts, to
reconcile the realities of their constitutional system with the radicalism of
the Declaration of Independence. The struggle began with the unresolved
doubts of some of the signers themselves,' and it continues to this day.
Alexis de Tocqueville, after touring the United States in 1831 and early
1832, 'was moved to write of the dangers of the human heart's "depraved
taste for equality, which impels the weak to attempt to lower the powerful to their own level, and reduces men to prefer equality in slavery to
inequality in freedom." ' He noted, however, the peculiarly American solution to the establishment of equality in the political world: that "every
citizen must be put in possession of his rights, or rights must be granted
2. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). For the full text of the Declaration of Independence, see DOCUMENTS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 100 (Henry Steele Commager, ed., 7th ed. 1963).
3. Id.
4. Readers who are interested in the lives of the signers of the Declaration of Independence can find no better starting point than the life of Thomas Jefferson, and no greater
resource than the wonderful six-volume biography of the nation's third president, DUMAS
MALONE, JEFFERSON AND HIS TIME (1948-81).
5. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 53 (Rev. ed. 1900).
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to no one." De Tocqueville reached a remarkable conclusion concerning
the American constitutional system.
At the present day the principle of the sovereignty of the people has
acquired, in the United States, all the practical development which the
imagination can conceive. It is unencumbered by those fictions which
[are] thrown over it in other countries, and it appears in every possible
form according to the exigency of the occasion.'
The principle of the sovereignty of the people was encumbered, of
course, by several very heavy burdens, some of which would not be removed until the twentieth century. In De Tocqueville's time, "sovereignty
of the people" obviously meant sovereignty of some of the people.
Women, as well as African-Americans (and Native Americans, too), were
excluded from the playing field. To the extent that the Declaration of
Independence promised something more with its reference to equality,
the America that De Tocqueville found in 1831 did not match the apparent vision of 1776. The America of 1993 obviously is very different from
De Tocqueville's America of 1831, but the promise (if that is what it was)
of equality found in the Declaration of Independence is not yet wholly
fulfilled. Was the vision of equality real or was it simply the product of
empty words used to meet the political necessities of a particular moment? Did the Constitution itself destroy the authentic promise of the
Declaration of Independence?
These questions are traditional topics of inquiry in the academic community, but their significance actually is far surpassed by another issue,
which has received too little attention: Can the Declaration of Independence positively inform and instruct the interpreters (not just the courts,
but the legislative and executive branches as well) of the American constitutional system? It is arguable that the true meaning of the Constitution is ascertainable only if the Constitution is viewed within the framework provided by the language of the Declaration of Independence.
The Declaration of Independence was the political reflection in 1776 of
a Newtonian intellectual univeise, a universe in which all things were rational and therefore subject to human understanding. Self-evident truths
and the capacity for self-government existed because moral and political
laws were included among the various laws of nature-of the Creator.
The rational man of the late eighteenth century Newtonian universe, confident in the source of basic law, considered himself to be perfectly capable of applying those, basic moral laws in the pursuit and realization of
6. Id.
7. Id. at 57.
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the principle of equality. That confident spirit was apparent in the language of the Declaration of Independence.
Only eleven years later, however, the draftsmen of the Constitution (in
large measure led by James Madison) took a fundamentally different
course. References to the Creator as the ultimate source of rights effectively disappeared. Rights no longer even were entrenched-totally protected against the Constitution's formal amendment process-much less
considered to be "unalienable."8 The Constitution was in no sense a Ten
Commandments of government, handed down on stone tablets by the
Creator to some post-Revolution Moses.
An inherent tension clearly exists between the language of the Declaration of Independence and the language of the Constitution. This tension,
contrasted against the veneration accorded to the Constitution during the
nineteenth century, even by Americans on opposite sides during the Civil
War, eventually was a major contributing factor in the development of
the various revisionist views of the Constitution that began to develop
during the early part of this century. Foremost among the revisionists, of
course, was Charles Austin Beard. In his renowned book, An Economic
Interpretation of the Constitution of the United States,' Beard pronounced the Constitution the product of rampant economic and class
elitism.'
Even the arguments of the early revisionists, however, tended to overlook the ultimate stress point in any attempt to reconcile the Declaration
of Independence and the Constitution. That stress point was, and is, slavery and its malignant modern-day successor, racial strife. In the broad
sweep (but, in historical terms, rather short duration) of the evolution of
the American constitutional system, the impact of slavery simply has
been immense. The actual language of the Declaration of Independence
rather accurately reflected the developing Anglo-American legal tradition
concerning slavery. Gradually, but with increasing rapidity, this tradition
had been eliminating slavery since shortly after the end of the Middle
Ages, the colonial slave trade notwithstanding. 1 Indeed, the enumeration
of the King's misdeeds set forth in the Declaration of Independence origi8. For an excellent new discussion of the Constitutional Convention, written with
James Madison as the focus, see WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE BUSINESS OF NEXT MAY: JAMES
MADISON AND THE FOUNDING (1992).
9.

CHARLES BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES (1913).

10. Beard's influence has waxed and waned throughout this century, but he remains one
of the very few historians whose views absolutely must be considered when studying the
history of the United States Constitution.
11. William M. Wiecek, The Witch at the Christening: Slavery and the Constitution's
Origins, in THE FRAMING AND RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTrrUTION 167, 172-73 (Leonard W.
Levy & Dennis J. Mahoney, eds., 1987).
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nally included a reference to the perpetuation of slavery in the colonies.
In what justifiably might be described as the first of the great "slavery
compromises," the authors withdrew that reference from the final version
of the Declaration of Independence. 3
The draftsmen of the Constitution, however, not only avoided any use
of the words "slave" or "slavery" in the document's text, they actually
included in the Constitution three specific protective provisions for the
institution of slavery. These protective provisions were:
1. Article I, Section 2, which provided in part that "[rlepresentatives and
direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be
included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons." 3 The effect of this section was that each slave counted as three-fifths of one person.
2. Article I, Section 9, which began with the declaration that "[t]he Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing
shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty
may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each
Person."" This section, of course, guaranteed the continuation of the
slave trade until 1808.
3. Article IV, Section 2, which stated in its third and final paragraph that
"[n]o Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws
thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may
be due.""' This section sought to insure the return of fugitive slaves to
their owners. It was a provision that eventually became a rallying point
for Abolitionists.
Contemporary American political leaders could take lessons from their
eighteenth-century predecessors in the precise, calculated manipulation
of words.
Those provisions, adopted in large measure with the intention of
preventing the new American nation from self-destructing at its inception, actually sowed the seeds for the greatest continuing crisis in the history of the United States: an on-going, two-hundred year racial conflict.
Those seeds produced as their bitter fruit the various sectional com12. Readers who wish to review the history of the Declaration of Independence in detail
can begin (and perhaps end) their inquiry with CARL BECKER. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (1922).
13. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2.
14. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9.
15. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2.
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promises attempted during the four decades preceding the presidential
election of 1860, the horrendous carnage of the Civil War, the anguish of
Reconstruction, the grim racial repression of the period from 1877-1941,
and the unfulfilled expectations of the civil rights movement (a movement that at times now seems to have degenerated into an endless, grinding legal and political argument over affirmative action).
The most interesting (and, for most readers, probably the best) discussion of the handling of the slavery question by the Constitutional Convention appears in William M. Wiecek's The Witch at the Christening:
Slavery and the Constitution's Origins, one of twenty-one essays by different authors included in an anthology entitled The Framingand Ratification of the Constitution." Wiecek provides a vivid description of the
quandary left in the wake of the Constitution's adoption:
Southerners sidestepped the problem posed by the ideology of the

Revolution by adopting the expedient of declaring blacks outside the
scope of those principles. Chief Justice Roger B. Taney reaffirmed this
evasion in the Dred Scott Case (1857) when he wrote that black slaves
could not have been included within the terms of the Declaration of Independence, "for if the language, as understood in that day, would em-

brace them, the conduct of the distinguished men who framed the declaration of independence would have been utterly and flagrantly
inconsistent with the principles they asserted." We read this passage and
condemn Taney for failing to grasp the liberating potential of the Declaration; yet we should recognize that he was doing no more than speaking
the mind of southern statesmen, both in his time and in 1776. Taney and
other southern spokesmen failed to perceive that two interpretations of
the American revolutionary experience were possible. They assumed that
blacks were not a part of anything that happened between 1760 and
1790, and consequently played no active role in the struggle for human
freedom that gave the American Revolution its only lasting meaning.
Blacks saw the matter differently. As Benjamin Quarles has recently
noted, the Revolutionary War was in effect "a black Declaration of Independence in the sense [that] it spurred black Americans to seek freedom
and equality. [They] viewed the war as an ongoing revolution in free''
dom's cause. 11
In a sense, the failure of the Founding Fathers to come to grips with
slavery was the failure of a dream that many of them held dear throughout their lives. In the words of William Freehling:
If men were evaluated in terms of dreams rather than deeds everyone
would concede the antislavery credentials of the Founding Fathers. No
16. Wiecek, supra note 11, at 167.
17. Id. at 173-74.
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American Revolutionary could square the principles of the Declaration
with the perpetuation of human bondage. Only a few men of 1776 considered the evil of slavery permanently necessary. None dared proclaim
the evil a good. Most looked forward to the day when the curse could be
forever erased from the land. "The love of justice and the love of country," Jefferson wrote Edward Coles in 1814, "plead equally the cause of
these people, and it is a moral reproach to us that they should have
pleaded it so long in vain.""
II.

RECENT LITERATURE

From 1787 to the present, Americans have been divided by the issue of
slavery and its successor, racial strife. During the last two years, the academic community has produced a small but rich harvest of material that
examines anew how these sore points of the past and present have affected and been affected by the American constitutional system. These
fresh interpretative and analytical efforts are particularly valuable because they are not limited strictly to the topics of slavery or race or both,
but instead take a broader view that avoids the erection of paper walls
between law, economics, politics, and sociology.
Among these recent works, the most comprehensive in its overall goal is
Bruce Ackerman's We the People: Foundations," the first volume of a
projected three-volume work. We the People undertakes the extraordinary task of constructing a model to explain the complete evolution of the
Constitution in both the legal and political arenas. Ackerman identifies
three great periods of genuine constitutional evolution: the adoption and
ratification of the Constitution itself, Reconstruction, and the New Deal.
It was in those three periods, says Ackerman, that the power of the ultimate sovereign-the people-made itself felt in and through the Constitution in a truly lasting way. The politics that was part and parcel of
these three periods of constitutional evolution is so clearly distinguishable
from normal politics, argues Ackerman, that, as a governmental system,
the United States actually functions as a dualist democracy. The politics
of constitutional evolution is constitutional politics, as distinguished from
normal politics. 1 As Ackerman explains it, dualism is a political reality
because it is a constitutional reality.
Above all else, a dualist Constitution seeks to distinguish between two
different decisions that may be made in a democracy. The first is a decision by the American people; the second, by their government.
18. William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathersand Slavery, in THE
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION 204 (Kermit L. Hall, ed., 1987).
19. 1 BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS (1991).

20.

Id. at 58.

21. Id. at 58-80.
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Decisions by the People occur rarely, and under special constitutional
conditions. Before gaining the authority to make supreme law in the
name of the People, a movement's political partisans must, first, convince an extraordinary number of their fellow citizens to take their proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to
politics; second, they must allow their opponents a fair opportunity to
organize their own forces; third, they must convince a majority of their
fellow Americans to support their initiative as its merits are discussed,
time and again, in the deliberative fora provided for "higher lawmaking."
It is only then that a political movement earns the enhanced legitimacy
the dualist Constitution accords to decisions made by the People.
[T]he dualist Constitution prevents elected politicians from exaggerating their authority. They are not to assert that a normal electoral victory
has given them a mandate to enact an ordinary statute that overturns
the considered judgments previously reached by the People. If they wish
to claim this higher form of democratic legitimacy, they must take to the
specially onerous obstacle course provided by a dualist Constitution for
purposes of higher lawmaking. Only if they succeed in mobilizing their
fellow citizens and gaining their repeated support in response to their
opponents' counterattacks may they finally earn the authority to proclaim that the People have changed their mind and have given their government new marching orders22
For Ackerman, the lasting impact of slavery is found in the Reconstruction amendments to the Constitution, amendments that surely would not
have been possible except in the unprecedented political conditions that
prevailed in the immediate aftermath of the Civil War. 8 Ackerman considers not only the substance of the Reconstruction amendments, but also
the processes that brought them to life (particularly in the case of the
Fourteenth Amendment) as vital to the evolution of the Constitution-equivalent in importance to the work of the Founders themselves in
2
making a Constitution. 4
In the case of the Fourteenth Amendment, many decades would pass
before the American constitutional system would feel its full substantive
weight. Indeed, use of the word "person" in segments of the amendment
rather than "citizens" raised questions about the motivations of the
amendment's principal draftsmen. Were they really concerned about pro22.
23.

Id. at 6-7.
For the two best discussions of the Reconstruction period ever written, see J.G. RAN-

DALL, THE CIVIL WAR AND RECONSTRUcION (1953 ed.), and EaIc FONER, RECONSTRUCTION:
AMERICA'S UNFINISHED RsVOLUTION 1863-1877 (1988).

24. The vision of some of the Radical Republicans of the Reconstruction period as the
successors of the Founders may be a bit amusing to many readers, but Ackerman's focus is
on process and substance, not on personalities. He makes no claim that the political leaders
of Reconstruction were, the intellectual and conceptual successors to Madison, Hamilton,
and their compatriots at the Constitutional Convention.
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tecting the former slaves, or was their primary interest the protection of
property rights (of corporate "persons," in effect)? Approached from another direction, was the Fourteenth Amendment limited only to the former slaves in its application (a so-called race theory of the amendment's
meaning), or did it have the potential for a broader impact? Ackerman
accords relatively little attention to such issues of substantive legislative
intent, issues that have received a huge amount of scrutiny in the historiography of the Fourteenth Amendment. Indeed, he does not even mention a case as famous as Gitlow v. New York," in which the United States
Supreme Court took its first step toward the incorporation of the Bill of
Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment." For Ackerman, however, other
considerations are more profound than the traditional areas of focus. The
constitutional politics that made possible the adoption of the Reconstruction amendments drastically revised the playing field on which the
legal ramifications of racial issues eventually would be resolved, and Ackerman emphasizes that point. The processes of true constitutional change
provide Ackerman's focus.
[T]he Reconstruction Republicans transformed the national separation of powers into an alternative to the Federalist system of constitutional revision that had been based exclusively on the division of powers
between state and nation. [There were] ... two important variations on
this new nationalistic theme. The Thirteenth Amendment introduces the
model of Presidentialleadership that will bulk large in our subsequent
analysis of the New Deal transformation. In this model, President and
Congress cooperate with one another to secure the validation of a constitutional amendment, despite the amendment's questionable legality
under the rules and principles laid down by the Federalist Constitution.
Within the context of Reconstruction, however, a second model [developed], generated by the struggle over the Fourteenth Amendment ....
As a result of the defection of President Andrew Johnson to the side of
the constitutional conservatives, it fell to the Republicans to develop a
model of Congressional leadership if they hoped to win higher law validation of their proposed Fourteenth Amendment.2'
The Civil War and Reconstruction marked an end to slavery in the
United States while, at the same time, signaling the beginning of a period

25. 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
26. The relevant language was buried in the middle of the Gitlow opinion. In a single
sentence the Court stated that "[flor present purposes we may and do assume that freedom
of speech and of the press-which are protected by the First Amendment from abridgement
by Congress-are among the fundamental personal rights and "liberties" protected by the
due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the States." Id. at
666. Rarely has so much been said in so few words.

27.

ACKERMAN,

supra note 19, at 45-46.
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of racial division that continues, in various forms, to this day. In The
Market Revolution: JacksonianAmerica 1815-1846,"B Charles Sellers provides one explanation for the diuturnity of this racial division. During the
Jacksonian era, Sellers contends, the triumph of a genuinely capitalist,
property-oriented economic system occurred in America at almost exactly
the same time that a populist political philosophy, which abhorred
wealth, also reached its zenith.29 In this odd combination lay the basis for
disaster. Sellers argues that the pro-capitalist "market revolution made
slavery the great contradiction of the liberal American republic."8 The
increasing significance of slavery in the economic system also insured the
continuation of racial strife long after the end of slavery itself.
The rigors of capitalist slavery were most fully rationalized when the
American cottonocracy utilized history's fullest freedoms of property and
labor exploitation in harnessing human property to the industrial revolution's most dynamic sector. By dehumanizing black chattels most systematically as market commodities, a slave regime less brutal than some
in other respects poisoned the liberal republic indefinitely with the most
virulent white racism.'
The "great contradiction" required more of the supporters of slavery
than merely an economic justification, however.
The only proslavery doctrine that proved compatible with democratic
liberalism for whites, and therefore widely acceptable to them, was black
racial inferiority. Dehumanization of blacks, moreover, staved off the
class shame of inequality for poor whites, justified ruthless exploitation
of black labor, and muted class conflict to enlist the farmer majority in
defense of the planters' imperiled labor system.2
I
Sellers obviously is aware of and influenced by Marxist scholarship on
American economic history. Needless to say, that fact makes it unlikely
that he ever will be cited with approval on the electronic chautauqua circuit. By refusing to separate economic considerations from other facets of
historical analysis, however, Sellers has made an important contribution
to the continuing debate over the roles of slavery and race in the American constitutional system.
The intransigent nature of issues relating to slavery and race plays a
key role in The Constitution in Conflict,33 by Robert A. Burt. The central
thesis of Burt's book is that both an authoritarian Supreme Court and a
28. CHARLES SELLERS,THE
29. Id. at 396.
30. Id.
31.

MARKET REVOLUTION: JACKSONIAN AMERICA

Id. at 396-97.

32. Id. at 409.
33. ROBERT A. BURT,

THE CONSTITUTION IN CONFLICT

(1992).

1815-1846 (1991).
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majoritarian political system are adverse to the true nature of the American constitutional system. Burt argues that a winner-take-all approach to
racial issues has produced a range of negative consequences that amount
to an unending "recriminatory cycle."'" The cycle, says Burt, now has
reached the stage of black rage-almost 130 years after a prolonged outburst of somewhat comparable white rage beginning during
Reconstruction:
This cycle still holds in the explosively bitter resentment of so many
American blacks today. Their rage, I believe, is only indirectly linked to
the nineteenth-century injustices of slave status; it has a more immediate
source in the humiliations and terror vindictively imposed on them in
this century by southern whites (tolerated and abetted by northern
whites). Vengeful resentment may have faded among southern whites today because their Civil War defeat is no longer a lived recollection for
any of them; and so they are prepared to jettison Jim Crow and its visible structure of retaliatory racial subjugation. But black resentment is
fueled today by living memory among the elder generation who were directly subjected to the segregation regime and the younger generation
who (like the children of Jewish Holocaust survivors) still see pervasive
threats to their existence and, scorning or denying their elders' apparent
past subservience, vow "Never again." And so, although the old retaliatory reasons have faded for white subjugation of blacks, whites now find
new reasons to fear and to subjugate blacks: self-protection in response
to blacks' expression of retaliatory vengeance toward whites."
The only resolution to this cycle, argues Burt, is the equality principle-the very opposite, in its meaning and operation, of the combination
of judicial authoritarianism and political majoritarianism that he so
deeply deplores.3 6 Burt presents a pessimistic analysis of the current state
of the American constitutional system, as exemplified by activities in the
political arena:
The core characteristic of ... [the prevailing] Manichaean polit-

ics-whether in matters of race or morality-is unrelenting hostility
among political opponents. Because these adversaries are unwilling to acknowledge even the possibility of common ground, they cannot imagine a
relationship based on mutual respect. And thus, no matter who prevails
in this raw conflict, the equality principle-the constitutive element of
democratic life-is defeated. 7
34. Id. at 354.

35. Id. at 355.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 356.
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For Burt, the ultimate constitutional scholar is none other than Abraham Lincoln. From Lincoln's words, Burt finds the basic limitations on
both the majority-rule doctrine and the coercive decision making power
of the Supreme Court."8 As a constitutional scholar, Abraham Lincoln has
received much closer attention in recent years, especially in Garry Wills'
remarkable book, Lincoln at Gettysburg: The Words that Remade
America.8 ' English teachers will glory in Wills' outstanding display of linguistic analysis in this study of the place of the Gettysburg Address in the
evolution of the American constitutional system. Wills' analysis is so
thorough that it more properly might be described as a linguistic dissection! More important, however, is Wills' substantive conclusion that Lincoln's brief address brought the importance of the concept of "the People," as included in the Declaration of Independence, to the forefront of
the American consciousness. 40 Lincoln was redefining the Constitution by
turning to the Declaration of Independence and, says Wills, Lincoln's
words remain strong enough to make the redefinition stick. 1
Wills argues that Lincoln, influenced by the reference in the Declaration of Independence to "the People," used the Gettysburg Address to
make the case "that America is a people . .

.

,,Lincoln's references to

."

the people, therefore, were much more significant than they would have
been simply as references to popular government. America, furthermore,
was "a people" dedicated to the proposition that all men are created
equal. According to Wills, "Lincoln changed the way people thought
about the Constitution .

. .,"

and for both states' rights advocates and

original intent advocates, "our politics has all been misdirected since that
time.

'4 3

Such scholars as Robert Bork insist that, for all practical pur-

poses, "equality as a national commitment has been sneaked into the
44

Constitution."

Interestingly, Lincoln's understanding of America as a people compelled him, as a matter of constitutional philosophy and not just political
shrewdness, to act with restraint in freeing slaves. The Emancipation
Proclamation, Wills contends, was limited in scope in large measure because when he issued it Lincoln did not wish to make any pretense of
acting under his civilian presidential powers, but rather only as com38. Id. at 81-86, 202. Burt's discussion of Lincoln's reservations about purely
majoritarian rule is wonderfully erudite.
39.

GARRY WILLS, LINCOLN AT GErrYSBURG: THE WORDS THAT REMADE AMERICA (1992).

40. Id. at 145.
41. Id.
42. Id.

43. Id. at 146.
44. Id.
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mander-in-chief of the army and navy."' Emancipation, as promulgated
by Lincoln, amounted to no more than a military action. Only through
the amendment process could the Constitution be changed to bring about
genuine, full emancipation." Wills states that "[plaradoxically, the Declaration as a founding document tied Lincoln's hands with regard to slavery."4 7 The People could do what not even the commander-in-chief could
do-change the Constitution.'
Lincoln has been severely criticized, and understandably so, for the
abuses of civil liberties that were a part of his effort to crush the Confederacy. Most recently, Mark Neely has dealt in great detail with the
lengthy record of military arrests under Lincoln in The Fate of Liberty:
Abraham Lincoln and Civil Liberties." It is worth remembering, as an
illustration of the seriousness of this record, that many of the arrests occurred in states that did not secede from the Union. Yet Neely, in effect,
confirms the understanding of Lincoln's evolving attitude toward equality-and freedom-set forth in Wills' discussion of the Gettysburg Address.50 Indeed, Lincoln moved from an attitude of reluctance concerning
any change in the Constitution to a position of strong support for a formal amendment ending slavery.51 Neely notes the deep personal significance of this change for Lincoln.
This [openness to constitutional amendment] was a major change in
his constitutional thinking. The Constitution was last amended five years
before Abraham Lincoln was born. He was on record in a speech in Congress recommending that the document be left alone and that the American people not get into the habit of changing it. In the desperate throes
of the secession crisis, he did agree to a proposed amendment that would
have explicitly guaranteed slavery where it already existed. But this was
redundant in Lincoln's view, merely reassuring the South of what it already had. In 1864, he wanted an amendment to guarantee that there
would be nothing temporary about emancipation.
This ability to balance short-term practicality and long-term ideals is
perhaps the essence of statesmanship. In Lincoln's case, the one helped
preserve the Constitution as the law of the land, and the other brought
such changes as made it worth preserving "throughout the indefinite
peaceful future."' 6
45.
46.
47.
48.

Id. at 136.
Id.
Id. at 137.
Id.

49. MARK E. NEELY,
(1991).
50. Id. at 221.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 221-22.

JR., THE FATE OF LIBERTY: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
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In Lincoln at. Gettysburg, Garry Wills certainly does not endeavor to
undertake a thorough exploration of the extremely complex, often even
devious, methods employed by Lincoln to win the Civil War. The reader
who wishes to examine those methods must go beyond Neely's book to
the myriad of other volumes on Lincoln that have been published over
the years.58 What Wills does accomplish, however, is to remind us that
Lincoln looked to the Declaration of Independence-the one truly great
document of the national history of the United States which predates
even the Constitution-as his primary source of understanding of what
the Constitution itself really means to us as a people. In a way that Ackerman, Sellers, and Burt do not, Wills offers a much needed intellectual
basis for continued hope in'an area of constitutional development that
has been characterized. for decades by bitterness, divisiveness, and hopes
left unfulfilled.54 If Wills is correct, Lincoln's special brand of scholarship
offers the most sound basis for reconciling the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. Even a successful intellectual reconciliation,
howeVer, does not insure the implementation of the equality principle.
Lincoln matched practical politics with constitutional scholarship in a
way that no one else had done since the generation of the Founding Fathers, and that no one has equaled since his death. 5 Today, however, almost 130 years after Lincoln spoke at Gettysburg, America still has not
53. The choice of what to read about Lincoln is a difficult one for the uninitiated. On the
assumption that most readers do not wish to spend the rest of their lives immersed in the
huge number of pages written about Lincoln, two specific suggestions are especially worth

consideration. See generally BENJAMIN P. THOMAS, ABRAHAM LINCOLN (1952). Forty years
after its publication, it still stands as one of the'best one-volume biographies ever written.
(The Thomas book also was involved in a major academic controversy during the last two
years, when another well-known Lincoln scholar was accused of having plagiarized Thomas'
work). See generally JAMES M. McPHERSON, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND THE SECOND AMERICAN

(1991). It is an excellent addition to any library.
54. Garry Wills is an interesting figure in the modern world of scholarship for a variety
of reasons, not the least of which is his reputation as something of a media star. Indeed,
REVOLUTION

Newsweek recently included Wills in its tongue-in-cheek (maybe) list of the top one-hun-

dred members of the "cultural elite." The magazine offered the following description of
Wills: "Apolymath specializing in America's intellectual history, he's the interpreter of current politics for the N.Y. Review of Books. You want a smart quote with a classy name
attached: Who ya gonna call?" The Newsweek 100, NEwswEK, Oct. 5, 1992, at 39. Wills

'now may be subject to the most scathing criticism that can be directed by scholars to a
colleague who becomes too famous: that he is trendy.

55. In fact, almost exactly one-hundred years would pass before another American president, John F. Kennedy, would deliver a speech that genuinely was in the spirit of the Gettysburg Address. Radio and Television Report to the American People on Civil Rights,

June 11, 1963,. in PUBLIC PAPERS OP THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES: JOHN F. KENNEDY 468 (1964). It is not a criticism of Kennedy to note that the speech, while memorable,
was no Gettysburg Address-and the words, while very much Kennedy's political responsibility, did not originate from his pen.
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come to grips unequivocally with the meaning of the equality principle.
For example, does it mean a literally color-blind society as a matter of
law, or does it mean a society in which affirmative action (clearly something other than color-blindness) is an appropriate tool in the pursuit of
equality? Americans have not demonstrated that they have achieved a
consensus even on the answer to that basic question. Robert Burt, for
one, argues in The Constitution in Conflict that the best answer may be
no answer-at least for now.
In our persisting racial conflicts, one proposition should, however, be
clear: the. political relationship between blacks and whites cannot be ended by unilateral secession on either side. So long as either disputant
insists that commitments are owed, that past obligations must be

honored, the relationship must persist until mutual satisfaction obtains.
This was the fundamental proposition that Lincoln would not surrender,
his bedrock understanding of the equality principle based on mutually

acknowledged respect. Current' affirmative action programs call this proposition into doubt, but in a complicated and confusing way. What is the
relationship between blacks and whites when, forty years after Brown,
there are no black faces in vast, privileged areas of American social life?
But if blacks-appear in these social enterprises only on rigidly separate
tracks, what then is the relationship between blacks and whites? In addressing these complex, high-stake questions today, the judicious
course-the best hope for protecting the possibility of equal relations between blacks and whites-would be to keep the controversy alive."
Whether the events of the next decade or two will allow the American
constitutional system to leave such a basic question unanswered remains
to be seen. One thing is certain, however. The application of the equality
principle is an issue that far transcends the recent "war" over political
correctness. That tempest-in-a-teapot conflict tends to trivialize the great
issues of the American constitutional system. The equality principle deserves a better fate than to be consigned to the scrap heap of pop culture
constitutionalism.
III. A SPEcIAL NOTE: FREEDOM
This Essay would not be complete without a brief reference to Freedom, 67 by Orlando Patterson. The first volume of Freedom, subtitled
Freedom in the Making of Western Culture, was published in 1991. The
second' and final volume is scheduled for publication in 1993. Patterson's
examination of the history of freedom is exceptional, perhaps unprece56. BURT, supra note 33, at 372.
57.

(1991).
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dented, in its scope. His book, however, is much more than a history of
freedom alone (as if that were not enough). It is, in addition, an exploration in the grand manner of what Patterson describes as a virtually
symbiotic relationship between freedom and slavery.' In Patterson's
words:
The basic argument of this work is that freedom is generated from the
experience of slavery. People came to value freedom, to construct it as a
powerful shared vision of life, as a result of their experience of, and response to, slavery or its recombinant form, serfdom, in their roles as masters, slaves, and nonslaves."
Patterson is quick to credit others for recognizing this unique (and
troubling) relationship, but Freedom is well on the *ay to standing alone
as perhaps the greatest display of scholarship ever produced in its field.
While mentioned in this Essay only as a special note, Freedom may be
the starting place for anyone interested in the millennia-long tension between freedom and slavery.5

58. Id. at xiii.
59. For the one work that probably deserves to be discussed in the same breath as Freedom, see D. DAVIS, THE PROBLEM OF SLAVERY IN WESTERN CULTURE (1966). That book certainly influenced Patterson's efforts in Freedom.

